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CHAPTER I

SUBMARINE WARFARE AND INTERNATIONAL LAW
This study is within the subject of public international law. More specifically, it concerns the laws of war which are designed to promote humanitarianism by mitigating the destruction of human and material values
which is involved in war. At 'the outset, it should be stated that it would
be far better to abolish war in the present highly interdependent world
community than merely to control it. Until it can be abolished, however,
it is necessary to control it as effectively as possible because of the tremendous destructiveness of contemporary weapons and the crucial importance of the values to be protected. 1
In view of the large number of limited wars which have taken place
since the conclusion of the Second World War, the juridical regulation of
war is a practical matter in the world community both now and in the
foreseeable future. Limited wars reflect the common interest of the community of states in minimizing the extensity and intensity of the coercion
employed. 2 If limited wars are to be kept limited rather than be "escalated" into general wars it is essential to apply the insights of public international law to this task.
This study focuses attention upon that part of the laws of war which
regulate naval warfare, and more particularly, submarine warfare. During
the World Wars two of the most important groups of juridical issues in
naval warfare have related to the long-distance naval blockade enforced
by surface warships and to submarine warfare. By using submarine warfare as an organizing principle it is not necessary to give consideration to
many of the traditional and routine juridical issues of naval warfare which
are covered adequately elsewhere. 3
The present study employs both customary international law (the implicit agreement of states) and treaty or conventional international law
1

Not all international lawyers agree with the text. See, e.g., Professor Fenwick:
"The laws of war belong to a past age and except for a few minor matters of no
consequence, it is futile to attempt to revive them . . . . War has got beyond the
control of law...." 43 Pro c. A.S.I.L. 110 ( 1949).
2
See generally Osgood passim and Halperin, Limited War in the Nuclear Age
( 1963).
3
Tucker is a text which considers the traditional laws of war at sea.
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(the explicit agreement of states), rather than being restricted to traditional judicial materials. Judicial materials, including the war crimes trials,
will be considered and applied in the inquiry where they are relevant.

A. THE SUBMARINE IN NAVAL WARFARE
In examining the law of submarine warfare one may profit from some
knowledge of the submarine and its role in warfare. The object of naval
warfare is sometimes stated to be the obtaining of control of the sea for
one's own purposes while denying its use to the enemy. 4 Submarines, like
other warships, may be used to achieve this objective. The unique ability
of the submarine warship to submerge enables it to operate independently
in high seas areas where the enemy maintains general control over the
surface of the sea. 5
The history of submarine warfare, or of warfare submerged, may be
traced in Herodotus to the famous feat of Scyllias of Scion and his diving
daughter who, we are told, swam under the ships of Xerxes and cut their
anchor chains. 6 Submarine warships were employed in war prior to the
First World War. 7 It was not until their extended use in that war, however,
that their military significance as warships was recognized. 8 Before that
war the principal projected use of submarines was against surface warships
rather than against merchant ships. 9

1. The Dual-Powered Submarine
a. PERFORMANCE CHARACTERISTICS

Other than its submergibility, the most striking characteristic of
'See Potter & Nimitz 2.
"(T]he submarine still remains the only type of ship-and here I include aircraft
in the term 'ship'-that can maintain itself unsupported for long periods in the face
of a distant enemy." Barry, "The Development of the Submarine," 80 ]. Royal
United Serv. Inst. 126, 138 ( 1935).
11
Herodotus, Book VIII Urania 584-85 (Isaac Taylor trans!. 1829). See also
Field, "The Beginnings of Submarine Warfare," 64 J. Royal United Serv. lnst. 382,
383 (1919).
7
See e.g. Bolander, "The Alligator_, First Federal Submarine of the Civil War,"
64 Nav. Inst. Proc. 845 ( 1938); Von Kolnitz, "The Confederate Submarine," 63
Nav. Inst. Proc. 1453 (1937). See generally Lake, The Submarine in War and
Peace (1918) aqd Fyfe, Submarine Warfare_, Past and Present (2nd ed. 1904).
8
"The way·· in which Germany used her submarines in the very earliest stages of
the war showed that she had little or no idea as to the immense power of the weapon
lying in her hands." Gibson & Prendergast, The German Submarine War 1914-1918
350 ( 1931).
9
Nimitz, "Military Value and Tactics of Modern Submarines," 38 Nav. Inst. Proc.
1193 ( 1912) . It rna y be noted that the same officer who recommended use against
warships served as Commander in Chief of the U.S. Pacific Fleet during World War
II when U.S. Navy submarines were used primarily against Japanese merchant ships.
5
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the prenuclear submarine was its dependence upon two separate propulsion systems, one for use on the surface and the other for use submerged.10 A wide variety of surface propulsion systems were employed
until the development of the diesel engine which shortly became the standard for surface propulsion. The dual-powered submarine was essentially
the surface torpedo boat conjoined with a limited submergence capability.
Its operational range and its speed on the surface were considerably greater
than its range and speed submerged. Storage batteries were uniformly
employed for underwater propulsion and this resulted in drastically limited
submerged speeds and endurance. The German oceangoing submarine of
the F.i rst World War had an endurance of from twenty-four to thirty-two
hours underwater at a speed of about five knots. If the submarine operated
for even a very short period ·o f time at maximum underwater speed it
greatly reduced its underwater range. The oceangoing submarine of World
War I typically had a cruising range of from 5,000 to 8,000 miles on the
surface. During both World Wars submarines were armed with torpedoes,
mines, and guns. The guns, of course, could only be used on the surface.
There was only a small improvement effected in underwater speeds
between the First and Second World Wars. During the First World War
most oceangoing submarines had a maximum surface speed of from ten
to fourteen knots. During the Second World War the maximum surface
speeds were raised to perhaps seven teen to twenty knots. These speeds were
low in comparison with the maximum speed of destroyers which was
twenty-eight to thirty knots during World War I and at least a few knots
higher during World War II.
In both World Wars the dual-powered submarine required relatively
long periods between sea operations for repairs and overhaul. In addition,
submarines typically required a voyage of some duration before reaching
the area of actual operations. Consequently, the number of submarines
engaged in war operations at a particular time was no more than a fraction of the total submarines in a particular navy.
A technical listing of submarine types has included arctic, aircraft carrier, cargo, midget, and minelayer among others. 11 Submarine merchant
vessels, best known through the German Deutschland which cruised to the
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The technical information in the present subsection is based upon Kuenne 9-31
and upon the naval encyclopedias, Jane's Fighting Ships (Blackman ed.; annual)
and Les Flottes de Combat (Le Masson ed.; biennial).
11
Committee on Undersea Warfare of the U.S. National Academy of Sciences, An
Annotated Bibliography of Submarine Technical Literature, 1557-1953 96-104
(1954).
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United States carrying cargo during the First World War/ 2 are not
usually armed. 13
b. COMBAT CAPABILITIES
The characteristics of submarines imposed limitations upon their
combat capabilities. At the beginning of the First World War the German
Navy contemplated use of submarines against warships rather than against
merchant ships. 14 In spite of some success in sinking surface warships/ 5
the submarine was soon redirected toward merchant shipping. In the First
World War, German submarines sank more than 11 million tons of Allied
and neutral merchant shipping. 16 It was well known that the German
submarine war brought the United Kingdom to the brink of defeat before
the United States entered the First World War. 17 Finally, the use of convoys to protect merchant shipping combined with drastic and comprehensive antisubmarine measures brought about the Allied victory. 18
Admiral Jellicoe has described the antisubmarine effort as it existed in
November 1917 when he was the First Sea Lord of the British Admiralty.
On the German side were some 178 submarines. On the British side
the forces in use to overcome these 178 submarines included approximately:
277
30
44
338
65
68

12

Destroyers
Sloops
"P" Boats
Motor Launches
Submarines
Coastal Motor-boats

49
849
867
24
50
194
77

Yachts
Trawlers
Drifters
Paddle Mine-sweepers
Airships
Air-craft
Decoy ships

7 Hackworth 459-61. See also Duncan, "Deutschland-Merchant Submarine,"
91 Nav. lnst. Proc. No· 4, 68 ( 1965); Hershey, "The Deutschland," 9 A.].l.L. 852
(1916).
The use of nuclear submarines as commercial tankers is recommended in Gallatin,
"The Future of Nuclear-Powered Submarines," 84 Nav. Inst. Proc. No. 6, 23 ( 1958).
13
Twenty-seven submarines or submersibles for undersea research purposes are
described in U.S. Interagency Committee on Oceanography, Undersea Vehicles for
Oceanography 21 ( 1965).
14
Spindler, "The Value of the Submarine in Naval Warfare," 52 Nav. lnst. Prqc.
835,837 (1926).
15
The best known example is the sinking of the British cruisers Aboukir, Hogue,
and Cressy on Sept. 22, 1914 by the German U- 9. Gibson & Prendergast, The German Submarine War 1914-1918 7-10 (1931).
16
Anderson, "The Protection of Commerce in War," 78 Nav. lnst. Proc. 881,
883 (1952).
17
Jellicoe, The Crisis of the Naval War (1920); Sims, The Victory at Sea (1920).
18
Ibid.
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In addition to this great fleet of vessels 'engaged in the war against
the 178 German submarines we laid over 10,000 mines in the last three
months of 1917 in the Heligoland Bight and the Straits of Dover, solely for the purpose of destroying some of these submarines, whilst in
1918, in addition to further very e~tensive mining in the Heligoland
Bight and Straits of Dover, some 100,000 mines were laid in the North
Sea Barrage. Can any better proof be afforded of the difficulty of antisubmarines warfare, than is given by these figures? They show clearly
the immense effect on Naval warfare, and Naval policy, of the introduction of a completely new offensive weapon. 19
The decoy ships referred to by Admiral J ellicoe are the Q-ships of fame
or infamy depending upon the acceptance of the British or German viewpoint.20 These ships appeared to be innocent merchantmen but were
actually heavily armed warships manned by Royal Navy personnel. Their
function was to lure German submarines to the surface and to destruction.
When a submarine attempted to carry out the time-honored procedures
of visit and search it became a nearly helpless object of attack. 21
Submarine warfare cannot be considered apart from what has been,
thus far, the submarine's principal object of attack, the merchant ship.
The solitary merchantman, unarmed and unescorted, was no match for
the submerged submarine assuming, of course, that it was not actually a
Q-ship. A convoy consisting of merchant ships and an adequate group of
naval escort vessels was usually more than a match for a single submarine. 22
In addition, a merchant ship could seriously damage or sink a submarine
by ramming.
In the Second World War, German submarines sank more than 23
million tons of Allied and neutral merchant shipping. 23 In the Pacific war
United States submarines sank approximately sixty percentum of the 9
million tons of Japanese merchant shipping which were destroyed by
the end of the war. 24 It seems clear that the destruction of the Japanese
merchant marine was a major factor in obtaining victory in the Pacific.
United States submarines were also used in support of fleet operations and
against Japanese warships. 25
19

Jellicoe, The Submarine Peril: The Admiralty Policy in 1917 183 (1934).
views appear in Campbell, My Mystery Ships ( 1928) and Chatterton,
"Q" Ships and their Story ( 1922). The German view appears in Tzschirner, Die
Baralong-Bestialitat ( 1918).
21
See generally Potter & Nimitz 462.
22
Potter & Nimitz 466-70; Cooke, "The Atlantic Convoys," 76 Nav. Inst. Proc.
863 ( 1950).
23
Anderson, supra note 16 at 881. ·
24
I d. at 887.
25
Forrestel, Admiral Raymond A. Spruance~ USN: A Study in Command 79, 13542 ( 1966); Roscoe, United States Submarine Operations in World War I I 361- 72
( Ch. 25 entitled "Submarine Support of Fleet Operations") ( 1949).
.
~British
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Japanese submarines en joyed no comparable success in attacking Allied
merchant shipping. One reason for the success of United States submarines
directed at Japanese merchant shipping was that the Japanese Navy never
gave _a major role to the protection of merchant shipping or to antisubmarine measures. 26 Such activities were considered contrary to the Japanese
Navy doctrine of the offensive which regarded United States warships as
its most important targets. 27 In spite of a few notable successes the J apanese submarines were not able to combat adequately the U.S. Navy surface
warships. In addition, there is considerable evidence that the Japanese
submarine power was dissipated in militarily inefficient operations. Professor Kuenne has summarized:
[Japanese] submarine resources were squandered on futile searches for
Allied men-of-war, on quixotic land bombardments, and on hopeless
supply operations for lost garrisons. These employments are evidence
of a total bankruptcy of strategic doctrine concerning the submarine,
and the record of the Japanese in these respects constitutes the most
shameful avoidable waste of a military resource in World War II. 28
Nonpowered cargo submarines or submersibles which are towed by
powered submarines may be regarded as a future method of sea transport
both in peace and in war. The Japanese built such submarines and employed them in the Second World War in attempting to supply isolated
and bypassed Japanese Army garrisons. 29 In addition, it is interesting to
note that the Japanese Army, probably because of a lack of interservice
cooperation and confidence, built and operated submarines which were
manned by army personnel and used to supply Japanese Army garrisons. 30

2. The Nuclear-Powered Submarine
a. PERFORMANCE CHARACTERISTICS

The contemporary nuclear-powered and nuclear-armed submarines
28

Atsushi Oi, "Why Japan's Anti-submarine Warfare Failed," 78 Nav. lnst. Proc.
587 ( 1952)
27
Hashimoto, Sunk: The Story of the Japanese Submarine Fleet~ 1941-1945 62
( 1954)
28
Kuenne 4, 5.
29
Such a submarine is described briefly in Bulkley, At Close Quarters: PT Boats
in the United States Navy 216-17 (1962). Technical description of this type of vessel termed "cargo carrying pipe" appears in Shizuo Fukui (ex-Constructor Lieut.
Comdr., Japanese Navy), Japanese Naval Vessels at the End of War 205, 206
( 1947, published in cooperation with U.S. occupation authorities in Japan) (copy
in Mahan Library, U.S. Naval War College, Newport, R.I.).
30
U.S. Strategic Bombing Survey (Pacific) Naval Analysis Division, 2 Interrogations of Japanese Officials-Submarine Warfare OPNAV-P-03-100, Nav No. 72,
USSBS No. 366 ( 10 Oct. 1945). Technical descriptions of the Army "transport
submarines" appear in Fukui, op. cit. supra note 29 at 217.
0

0
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are very different warships from their predecessor submarines of both
World Wars. 31 The use of a single high-power system for both submerged
and surface cruising has eliminated the limitations of a dual-powered
system. Perhaps the most striking feature of nuclear power is that the
submarine is now truly a submersible. When it comes to the surface it
does so because of tactical considerations and not because of inability to
cruise submerged for great distances. Its hull is streamlined and designed
for submerged rather than surface cruising.
The nuclear-powered submarine is one of the fastest warships and has
the capability of maintaining high speeds for long periods of time. Since
it is designed for submerged rathe~ than surface cruising it is typically
capable of a higher underwater than surface speed. In 1955 the N au til us,
the first of the United States nuclear submarines, traveled at an average
submerged speed of sixteen knots maintained for over 1300 miles. The
N au tilus does not have the streamlined hull designed to increase underwater speed which the later nuclear submarines have. Accurate official
information on contemporary speeds is not available. One civilian authority,
however, has stated: "Speeds of at least 30 knots submerged are now
taken for granted, and indeed targets of 50 knots are talked of by some as
possible in the future." 32
The increase in the operational range of submarines is even more striking than the speeds now obtainable. Using the Nautilus as an example
again, its "second reactor [core] was pulled and replaced in 1959 during
routine overhaul after 26 months and steaming 93,000 miles of which
78,885 was [sic] underwater." 33 The Triton, a newer nuclear submarine,
"circumnavigated the globe submerged in 1960 for 83 days and 41,500
miles at an average speed of 18 kts. She refuelled in mid-1962 after steaming 110,000 miles." 34
The newer nuclear submarines operate at great depths. One authority
has suggested a depth of 900 feet for contemporary submarines. 35 If this
figure represents a safe operational depth, it is probable that these submarines could occasionally operate at greater depths on an emergency
basis.
The contemporary emphasis on nuclear submarines in the U.S. Navy
is demonstrated by the existence of sixty nuclear submarines out of a

31

The technical information in the present subsection is based in substantial part
upon the following sources: Jane's Fighting Ships 1965-66; Les Flottes de Combat
1966; and Kuenne 177-92.
32
Kuenne 180.
83
Jane's Fighting Ships 1965-66 372.
a. I d. at 370. See Beach, Around the World Submerged ( 1962).
35
Kuenne 181.
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total of 140 submarines. 36 The respective figures for the Soviet Navy are
thirty-five and 390 37 and for the British Navy, two and 42. 38

b. COMBAT CAPABILITIES
Nuclear energy has also equipped the nuclear-powered submarine
with the most awesome and devastating weapons of mass destruction.
The latest United States fleet ballistic missile submarines each carry sixteen Polaris type A-3 missiles, each of which can project a warhead of
approximately . 75 megatons for a distance of approximately 2800 miles. 39
These missiles are regarded as being capable of high precision aiming
considering the distances involved. In summary, a single fleet ballistic
missile submarine carries approximately twelve megatons of TNT explosive equivalent. This is greater than the explosive equivalent of the entire
Allied aerial bombing operations during the Second World War. 40 These
basic energy weapons with their rapid missile delivery systems will be
appraised juridically in Chapter V concerning weapons of attack.
The fleet ballistic missile submarine with its strategic bombardment
function comprises one of the two principal types of nuclear submarines.
The other is the nuclear attack submarine and it apparently has approximately the same functions of attack against merchant ships and warships
as did the traditional submarine of the two World Wars. 41 Both types
have weapons which are designed for submerged firing and the deck guns,
typical of the earlier submarines, are not mounted on the nuclear ones.
The nuclear attack submarine is equipped with nuclear weapons of the
type usually described as tactical. These weapons include very high-speed
homing torpedoes which may be directed at either surface ships or other
submarines. 42 They also include an antisubmarine rocket, "SUBROC,"
which is launched from a submerged submarine's torpedo tube and
operates underwater-to-air-to-underwater. 43 In short, the offensive capability of the new attack submarine is vastly greater than that of its predecessors during the World Wars.
The nonnuclear submarine was readily outclassed in speed by destroyers
and other surface warships as well as by some merchant ships. In contrast,
the nuclear submarine may well be able to outrun its most speedy surface
opponents whether it is attempting to take defensive and evasive action
or is attacking surface warships. Historically, the traditional submarine
36

jane's Fighting Ships 1965-66 460.
Ibid.
38
Ibid. The respective figures for France are zero and nineteen. Ibid.
39
Kuenne 178.
40
Ibid.
41
Kuenne 188-91 and passim.
42
Martell, "Defending the Sea," Industrial Research 95, 98 (March 1966).
37

~Ibid.
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has not usually been a militarily effective combatant unit employed
against modern surface warships. 'The offensive capabilities of the new
attack submarine may well have changed this situation so that surface
warships become principal objects of attack. 44
There can be no doubt but that the combat capabilities of antisubmarine warfare have also been greatly increased since the end of the
Second World War. 45 It would be hazardous, nevertheless, to assume that
antisubmarine warfare has kept pace with submarine warfare. It must be
recalled that in two World Wars the dual-powered German submarines
were almost successful in defeating all antisubmarine efforts. 46 One professional observer has recently concluded that "the submarine has opened
a yawning gap between its own capabilities and those of the ASW forces." 47
In addition, the convoy system which was one of the chief means of
defeating the traditional submarines was based upon a concentration of
shipping. One may wonder to what extent concentration, rather than
dispersal, ~nvolves unacceptable ·risks in an era of tactical and strategic
nuclear weapons.

3. Future Submarine Warfare
There is, of course, no reason to believe that contemporary attack
and fleet ballistic missile submarines represent the final- development of
submarine warfare or warfare submerged. 48 Without indicating all of the
possibilities, it has been suggested that the future "ocean-based missile
force could conceivably take some totally new direction of development
in the future which would hopefully combine many of the better characteristics of the land-based force." 49
The same report continues:
Such developments may, for example, take the form of missiles of
Polaris' size or even considerably larger placed on relatively shallow
44
45

Kuenne 189.
Weakley, "Antisubmarine Warfare-Where Do We Stand?" Naval Review 1965

2 ( 1964).
~The antisubmarine war against Germany in World War II is described in 1

Morison, History of United States Naval Operations in World War II: The Battle
of the Atlantic ( 194 7) and U.nited Kingdom Gov't, The Battle of the Atlantic
( 1946).
Popular accounts appear in Farago, The Tenth Fleet ( 1962) and Lewis, The
Fight for the Sea ( 1961). Each of these two contains inaccuracies and the latter at
204 even confuses the civilian and naval heads of the British Navy.
41
R. H. Smith, Jr., "The Submarine's Long Shadow," 92 Nav. Inst. Proc. No. 3,
p. 30, 34 (1966).
'B See generally Grenfell, "The Gro~ing Role of the Submarine," 89 Nav. Inst.
Pro c. No. 1, p. 49 ( 1963).
49
Report of the Panel on Oceanography of the President's Science Advisory Committee, Effective Use of the Sea 33 ( 1966).
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underwater barge systems on the Continental Shelf in a way which ,
conceals their location and requires the system to move infrequently
so that the potential of its being tracked by motion-generated noise
is minimized. In addition one might consider a slightly mobile oceanbottom system which creeps along. 50
It should not be necessary to emphasize the common interest of all states
and all people in abolishing the weapons of mass destruction through
effective international control. Until this is done, it is the comparatively
modest function of the laws of war to limit their use, whenever possible,
in order to protect humanitarian values.

B. PRINCIPAL CLAIMS CATEGORIES IN SUBMARINE
WARFARE
The factual process of coercion gives rise to claims and counterclaims
concerning the lawfulness or unlawfulness of various methods and techniques of naval warfare. These claims and counterclaims are advanced
by the neutral states as well as by the belligerent ones. They constitute the
particular juridical controversies which are resolved by the decision-makers
through the application of the legal doctrines.
It is helpful for purposes of systematic organization and appraisal to
identify and group together each of the major claims categories. Each
such category comprises a closely related group of claims and counterclaims which raise significant juridical issues. In submarine warfare there
are four major categories of claims.

I. Claims Concerning Combatants
Only individuals who have lawful combatant status are entitled to
exercise violence during war or hostilities. Such individuals, upon capture
by the enemy, are to be accorded the standard of treatment prescribed
by international law for prisoners of war. Unlawful combatants who are
captured enjoy considerably less protection under law.
In naval warfare the basic combatant unit is typically a vessel or aircraft which is manned by a group of individuals. A warship or a naval
aircraft is a lawful combatant unit since it satisfies the dual legal requirements of public authorization and control. The lawful combatant status
of the crew members is associated with that of their warship or aircraft.
The submarine, unlike other warships, has been the subject of controversy
concerning its combatant status. The principal claim has been that it

50

Ibid. See id. at 30-40 concerning oceanography, national security and submarine
or submerged weapons. See also Craven, "Sea Power and the Sea Bed," 92 Nav.
lnst. Proc. No.4, p. 36 (1966); Alexander, "Oceanography and Future Naval Warfare," 89 Nav. Inst. Proc. No. 6, p. 66 ( 1963).
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should be denied lawful combatant status. The countering claim is that
the submarine has the same combatant status as any other warship. 51

2. Claims Concerning Areas of Belligerent Operation
The high seas are employed in time of war for the conduct of submarine warfare. These are the same areas which are employed by neutral
states for interneutral trade as well as for trade with one or more of the
belligerents. These conflicting uses give rise to claims and counterclaims
between belligerents and neutral states. The typical belligerent claim is to
establish a submarine operational area from which neutral merchant
shipping may be legally excluded with the sanction of sinking without
further warning if such shipping persists in entering the area. This claim
is used by the belligerent to reach. the enemy belligerent through the
neutral states which supply the enemy belligerent and so support its war
economy. The typical neutral counterclaim is that neutral merchant ships
have the legal right to use the high seas without being subjected to this
type of belligerent action.
There are also interbelligerent claims concerning submarine operational
areas. The typical claim is to employ the operational area against the
enemy belligerent as a distinctive method of submarine warfare. 52

3. Claims Concerning Objects and Methods of Belligerent
Attack
Claims and counterclaims concerning the lawfulness of particular
objects as targets of attack and claims and counterclaims concerning
methods of attack are so closely related that they may be grouped conveniently in one category. A typical belligerent claim is that submarines
may lawfully sink enemy merchant ships without warning. The countering
claim is that enemy merchant ships may not be sunk lawfully unless the
crew and passengers are assured a place of safety.
Claims concerning objects and methods of attack in naval warfare also
include the issue of the applicability to submarines of the generally recognized legal duty to search for and rescue the survivors after each naval
engagement. The claim is that submarines have the same legal obligations
as other warships in this respect. The countering claim is that submarines
simply do not have adequate· space to carry survivors and, consequently,
the obligation to rescue survivors is inapplicable. 53

4. Claims Concerning Weapons of Belligerent Attack
The crucial importance of clai~s and counterclaims concerning the
61

62

53

Claims concerning combatants are appraised in Chapter II.
Claims concerning areas of operation are appraised in Chapter III.
Claims concerning objects and methods ate appraised in Chapter IV.
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lawfulness of weapons is demonstrated by the greatly increased efficiency
of the traditional weapons combined with the development of contemporary weapons of mass destruction. The awesome characteristics of these
latter weapons are far beyond that of the traditional '\veapons and traditional experience. It has been pointed out above that contemporary submarines possess both a tactical and strategic nuclear capability.
The most general claim in this category is that all militarily efficient
weapons are lawful. The countering claim is that particular weapons are
unlawful because they create suffering and injury disproportionate to their
military utility. 54

C. THE LAWS OF WAR: SOURCES, PRINCIPLES, AND
SANCTIONS
It is well known that war is accompanied by the destruction of human
and material values. A central objective of the laws of war is to reduce the
destructiveness involved in military operations by providing at least a
minimum standard of protection to individuals. The individuals who are
so protected comprise noncombatants and combatants including the
wounded, the shipwrecked, and prisoners of war. 55

1. Sources of Decision
The decision-makers of international law, during both peace and war,
in the present decentralized organization of the world community, include
the officials of various international public organizations. The most important contemporary international law decision-makers, however, are the officials of national states. These same national officials also act upon occasion
as claimants concerning the exercise of coercion on behalf of their nationstates. This duality of function permits, and indeed requires, reciprocity to
operate as a sanction which promotes the common self-interest of the
community of states in all rational claims and decisions. 56 Among the
national decision-makers of the international laws of war is the military
officer. In certain circumstances the military or naval commander must
determine the legality of his own proposed military measures and of the
measures employed by the enemy. 57
54

Claims concerning weapons are appraised in Chapter V.
Relevant conventional and customary law authorities are cited infra In the
present section.
56
See McDougal & Feliciano 40.
57
The Law of Naval Warfare section 310(b) states that:
[A] subordinate commander may, on his own initiative, order appropriate reprisals,
but only after as careful an inquiry into the alleged offense as circumstances
permit. Hasty or ill-considered action may be found subsequently to have been
unjustified and may subject the officer himself to punishment for violation of the
laws of war.
There is a similar provision in The Law of Land Warfare paragraph 497(d).
515
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The decision-makers are authorized to resort to the legal doctrines of
both conventional and customary law in making particular decisions. The
function of these doctrines is not, of course, to automatically direct the
decision-makers to a predetermined decision. 58 It is rather to direct their
attention to the significant common values of the community of states
which are protected by the laws of war. Since the doctrines are to be
considered in varying contexts there must be careful factual analysis as a
preliminary to equally careful ascertainment of doctrinal relevance and
applicability. In addition, appropriate weight must be given to the changing conditions of war including its changing technology. So conceived, the
legal doctrines may be utilized to enhance rational and just decisions.
Illustration of some of the s,ignificant factors which should be considered in decision is provided by the j~dgment of a United States Military
Tribunal in The Flick Trial. 59
They [the provisions of Hague Convention IV of 1907] were written
in a day when armies travelled_on foot, in horse-drawn vehicles and
on railroad trains; the automobile was in its Ford Model T stage. Use
of the airplane as an instrument of war was merely a dream. The
atomic bomb was beyond the realms of imagination. Concentration
of industry into huge organisations transcending national boundaries
had barely begun. Blockades were the principal means of 'economic
warfare.' 'Total warfare' only became a reality in the recent conflict.
These developments make plain the necessity of appraising the conduct of defendants with relation to the circumstances and conditions
of their environment. Guilt, or the extent thereof, may not be determined theoretically or abstractly. Reasonable and practical standards
must be considered.

a. CONVENTIONAL LAW
The conventional or treaty laws of war, based upon the express
agreement of states, 60 are properly associated with international conferences, such as those at the Hague and in Geneva. The latest significant
example of lawmaking concerning war by international convention are
the four Geneva Conventions of 1949 for the Protection of War Victims. 61
58

Contrast Stone, Aggression and World Order 10-11 and passim ( 1958) which
is criticized in McDougal & Feliciano 151-55.
59
9 Reps. U.N. Comm. 1, 23 (1947).
60
The Soviet Union emphasizes express agreement over other sources. Ramundo,
The (Soviet) Socialist Theory of International Law 1-2, 27-28, 57-58 (George
Washington Univ. lnst. for Sino-Soviet Studies No. 1, 1964).
81
Geneva Convention for the Ameli~ration of the Condition of the Wounded and
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The detailed rules of these Conventions provide for some substantive ill).provements over preexisting conventional and customary law concerning
the same subjects. It is unfortunate, however, that the prescription of law
by explicit agreement has rarely achieved more than a restatement or
codification of the existing customary consensus on the particular subject.
The national negotiators meeting at international conferences in time of
peace must be concerned about the future security of their respective
states and are understandably hesitant to recommend rules which are
unlikely to meet the test of a future war.
The principal international conventions or agreements which provide
rules and principles conerning the conduct of war at sea are:
Hague Convention VIII Relative to the Laying of Automatic Submarine Contact Mines ( 1907) 62
Hague Convention IX Respecting Bombardment by Naval Forces
in Time of War ( 1907) 63
Hague Convention XI Relative to Certain Restrictions with Regard
to the Exercise of the Right of Capture in Naval War ( 1907) 64
Hague Convention XIII Concerning the Rights and Duties of
Neutral Powers in Naval War ( 1907) 65
The Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of
Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of the Armed Forces at
Sea ( 1949) 66
Article 22 of the Treaty for the Limitation and Reduction of Naval
Armament (London, 1930) 67
Article 22 of the London Naval Treaty is the only express agreement
directed to the regulation of submarine warfare. It is set forth and interpreted in Chapters III and IV of the present study. Article 23 of the
same treaty provides that "Part IV [art. 22] shall remain in force without
limit of time." Prior to the expiration of the other provisions of the Treaty
the parties to it invited all other states to agree to the article 22 rules
through the Proces-Verbal Relating to the Rules of Submarine Warfare
Set Forth in Part IV of the Treaty of London (of 1930) (November 6,
1936). 68 The rules, consequently, are now in effect between forty-eight
T.I.A.S. 3363; Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, 6
U.S.T. & 0./.A. 3316 (1956), T.I.A.S. 3364; Geneva Convention Relative to the
Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, 6 U.S.T. & 0./.A. 3516 (1956),
T.I.A.S. 3365.
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states, including --the principal naval powers, and the Holy See.

69

b. CUSTOMARY LAW
The pragmatic case-by-case development of the customary laws of
war is, of course, a continuous process only in time of war or hostilities.
This implicit agreement of states is, nevertheless, more comprehensive in
doctrinal content and more effective than express conventional agreement
in the development of the laws of war. In a fundamental sense it may be
regarded as the accumulated juridical learning concerning the subject.
Customary international law authorizes decision-makers to achieve contemporaneously effective and socially responsive decision by the rational
evaluation of past authoritative experience. Thus, the inherited doctrines
may be adapted to the needs of legal control in an era of rapidly changing
technology or, in the alternative, be allowed to lapse and expire through
disuse. In these respects the customary laws of war are similar to the
Anglo-American customary common law. The laws of war tend to emphasize experience over logic 70 and, again like the common law, develop
upon the basis of legislative or policy factors: "considerations of what is
expedient for the community concerned." 71 A view of the relevant sources
of law and of change in the customary laws of war is reflected in the
Judgment of the International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg:
The law of war is to be found not only in treaties but in the customs
and practices of states which gradually obtained universal recognition,
and from the general principles of justice applied by jurists and practiced by military courts. This law is not static, but continual adaptation follows the needs of a changing world. 72
The judgment of the United States Supreme Court in The Paquete
H abana 73 provides illustration of the ascertainment and application of
customary law to naval war. Coastal fishing boats operating from Havana,
which were not participating in the war, had been captured by U.S. Navy
vessels on blockade duty during the Spanish-American War. The issue
was whether or not such craft could be captured and condemned. The
Court responded negatively and stated:
119
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By an ancient usage among civilized nations, beginning centuries
ago, and gradually ripening into a rule of international law, coast
fishing vessels, pursuing their vocation of catching and bringing in
fresh fish, have been recognized as exempt, with their cargoes and
crews, from capture as prize of war. 74
The doctrinal holding of the immunity of coastal fishing boats which do
not participate in the war or hostilities was based entirely upon the customary international law since it was not set out in any applicable international agreement or municipal regulation of the United States. The case
also illustrates a function of the laws of war: humanitarianism will be advanced by the protection of noncombatants and their property when it is
consistent with the maintenance of military efficiency.

2. Basic Princi pies
The basic principles of the laws of war usually refer to military
necessity and humanitv. The principle of chivalry is sometimes added even
though it appears to be only a relic of medieval times when combat between mounted warriors of high social status was regulated by formalistic
rules. 75 The principle of military necessity has frequently been formulated
in broad and open-ended terms. For example, Oppenheim-Lauterpacht
describe it as:
[T]he principle that a belligerent is justified in applying any amount
and any kind of force which is necessary for the realisation of the
purpose of war-namely, the overpowering of the opponent. 76
The quoted formulation and similar ones are so comprehensive as to
permit great and unreasonable amounts and types of force to be legally
justified. If such a statement of the principle were actually applied the
result would be to sweep away the substantive restrictions of the laws of
war. A more restrictive formulation of the principle is clearly desirable.
One is set forth in the Law of Naval Warfare.
The principle of military necessity permits a belligerent to apply only
that degree and kind of regulated force, not otherwise prohibited by
the laws of war, required for the partial or complete submission of
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the enemy with the least possible expenditure of time, life, and physical
resources. 77
This formulation makes it clear that the principle is subject to the express
prohibitions of the laws of war. Military necessity should be regarded as
legalizing only that destruction which is necessary to the prompt achievement of lawful military objectives. More specifically, military necessity only
justifies destruction which is both relevant and proportionate. Such destruction must be relevant to the attainment of lawful military objectives. It
must also be proportionate in the sense of a reasonable relation between
the amount of the destruction carried out and the military importance of
the object of attack. Based upon past experience, the requirements as
applied in actual war or hostilities are only that the irrelevance and disproportionality of the destruction effected must not be great. 78
With this interpretation placed upon military necessity there remains
a pervasive ambiguity in the conception of "lawful miltary objectives."
The determination of the lawfulness · of particular objects of attack in
submarine warfare is a central task of Chapter IV of the present study.
The principle of humanity is formulated as follows in the Law of Naval
Warfare:

The principle of humanity prohibits the employment of any kind
or degree of force not necessary for the purpose of the war, i.e., for
the partial or complete submission of the enemy with the least possible
expenditure of time, life, and physical resources. 79
On first impression the formulation of the humanity principle appears to be
an obvious tautology since it only prohibits the use of force which is not
permitted under the principle of military necessity. In addition, the phrase,
"the purpose of the war," is as open-ended and ambiguous as is the conception of "lawful military objectives." The principle of humanity, consequently, appears no more precise than that of military necessity.
Both basic principles, nevertheless, protect important value interests of
the world community. Until war and hostilities are abolished, the basic
principles reflect the interest of states in conducting war or hostilities (at
least for defensive purposes), but in conducting them with the least possible
destruction of human and material values. 80 It is wanton and unreasonable
destruction which is made illegal by the principles of military necessity
and humanity.
The application of the two basic principles presents little difficulty in
clear-cut factual situations. For example, it should be readily apparent that
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it is legally permissible under the principles for submarines to sink without
warning those enemy merchant ships which are armed and convoyed by
the naval forces of the enemy belligerent. It should be equally apparent
that it is illegal under the principles to kill the helpless survivors of the
same merchant ships. 81
In the many difficult and complex factual situations which arise the
decision-maker may be aided by other and more specific legal principles.
Whether there are other relevant principles or not, there is no substitute
for careful factual analysis in each case combined with insight concerning
the values to be protected by each of the basic principles. Illustration of
the considerations which are involved in a careful juridical appraisal is
provided by a United States Military Tribunal in United States v. List:
Military necessity has been invoked by the defendants as justifying
the killing of innocent members of the population and the destruction
of villages and towns in the occupied territory. Military necessity permits a belligerent, subject to the laws of war, to apply any amount
and kind of force to compel the complete submission of the enemy
with the least possible expenditure of time, life, and money. In general,
it sanctions measures by an occupant necessary to protect the safety
of his forces and to faciliate the success of his operations. It permits
the destruction of life of armed enemies and other persons whose destruction is incidentally unavoidable by the armed conflicts of the war;
it allows the capturing of armed enemies and others of peculiar danger, but it does not permit the killing of innocent inhabitants for purposes of revenge or the satisfaction of a lust to kill. The destruction
of property to be lawful must be imperatively demanded by the neccessities of war. Destruction as an end in itself is a violation of international law. There must be some reasonable connection between the
destruction of property and the overcoming of the enemy forces. It
is lawful to destroy railways, lines of communications or any other
property that might be utilized by the enemy. Private homes and
churches even may be destroyed if necessary for military operations.
It does not admit the wanton devastation of a district or the willful
infliction of suffering upon its inhabitants for the sake of suffering
alone. 82
Although stated in terms of military necessity, it may be noted that the
quoted analysis is entirely consistent with the principle of humanity. In a
superficial analysis the two principles may appear to be opposites. Nevertheless, the application of either principle as if the other did not exist
81
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would result in unbalanced decision. It is essential to apply each principle
in the light of the other if the common interests of states are to be honored.
From this perspective, each principle may be usefully conceived as merely
an element of a larger composite principle which comprises both military
necessity and humanity. 83 At the very least, the complementary character
of the two traditional principles should be recognized and stressed in order
to promote just decisions.

3. Sanctions
Laws of war of ideal doctrinal content would e:mphasize the principle
of humanity over other principles. Such laws of war without enforcement
would be less effective in protecting human values than laws in which the
doctrinal content is frankly recognized as a compromise between humanitarianism and military necessity and which have at least a measure of
enforcement. To achieve effectiveness it is necessary to adapt precise nineteenth century formulations of legal rules to the realities of modern naval
warfare while maintaining the basic .principles and values in the rules
rather than to abandon ·the attempt to regulate naval warfare. 84 It is also
necessary to recognize that a usable conception of law, whether international or municipal, should include at least some element of sanction or
enforcement. The term "sanction" is here used broadly to refer to anything which promotes adherence to the law. 85 If there is no possibility of
enforcement it is illusory to invoke the label of "law."
Since it is sometimes alleged that the laws of war are not law at all
in the sense of being susceptible to enforcement, it should be mentioned
that the sanction of the laws of war is the common conviction of the participants in the war or hostilities that self-interest is advanced by adhering to the law rather than by violating it. This is, of course, the same as
the basic sanction for any other body of law whether international or
municipal. 86 The conception is that the interests of the participants are
not only mutual but reciprocal as well. It is recognized that the laws of
war cannot be long sanctioned as to one participant alone. The sanction
applies to all on the condition of reciprocity in observance. When reciprocity in observance breaks down, acts of reprisal may be employed to
induce observance.
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The participants also share an interest in economy in the use of force. 87
The destruction of values which is unnecessary to obtain military objectives is obviously uneconomical use of force since it involves the expenditure of force without a return in net military advantage. In addition, the
unregulated use of coercion contrary to the laws of war will very likely
increase the enemy's will to resist and thus will compel the use of a greater
quantum of coercion than should have been necessary to secure the same
military objective. It is conceded that the effectiveness of this sanction is
dependent upon the rationality of the participants in the war or hostilities
as well as their dedication to humanitarian values. 88 When a pathological
desire for destruction as an end in itself supplants rational calculations of
self-interest, there may be a corresponding breakdown in the enforcement
of the laws of war.
Reprisals are widely regarded as sanctions to obtain adQ.erence to the
laws of war. 89 A reprisal measure is an act, otherwise unlawful, which one
belligerent directs against the enemy belligerent in retaliation for illegal
acts of warfare by the latter. The object of a reprisal is to obtain adherence
to the laws of war and consequently when the opposing belligerent terminates his illegal practice the reprisal should be stopped. Even the possibility
of future reprisals is regarded as a sanction which deters a belligerent from
violating the laws of war.
The Geneva Conventions of 1949 reduce significantly the individuals
against whom reprisals may be legally directed. 90 The Geneva Sea Convention provides:
Reprisals against the wounded, sick and shipwrecked persons, the
personnel, the vessels or the equipment protected by the Convention
are prohibited. 91
In anticipation of claims appraised in Chapter III, particular techniques
of submarine warfare have frequently been claimed to be legitimate reprisals in both World Wars. For example, the German claim to establish
submarine operational areas has been advanced as a legitimate reprisal in
response to alleged illegalities in the British conduct of naval war. The
British naval warfare methods were, in turn, based upon alleged German
illegalities. Both the German submarine operational area and the British
long-distance blockade were each claimed to be justified as a legitimate
87
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reprisal. If appraisal is limited to their validity as measures of reprisal
only, it is possible to conclude that the substantive law of naval warfare
remains unchanged. The persistent and continuing character of these
naval methods throughout both World Wars, however, may suggest that
their use reflects a basic change in the customary international law of war.
Reprisals have been invoked with such frequency in naval warfare that
they may be regarded as having a legislative function. This function is to
bring the traditional doctrines up to date so that they apply to the contemporary methods of war. 92
War crimes trials may be regarded as a deterrent sanction for the laws
of war. 93 The conception is that the mere possibility of trials after the conclusion of the war may be an effective deterrent. It should not be assumed
that only military personnel of the vanquished state will be subjected to
trial. Although the personnel of victorious states are not usually subject
to war crimes trials under international law, they may be subject to trial
under municipal law including the military code governing the armed
forces. The important point is that municipal military codes such as the
United States Uniform Code of Military Justice 94 prohibit in substance
the same type of conduct which is prohibited by the international laws of
war.
The submarine war conducted by Germany during the Second World
War is the largest such military operation in history from the standpoint
of the numbers of submarines and of submarine personnel involved. 95 At
the conclusion of that war there was one war crimes trial in which German submarine personnel were charged with violation of the laws of war
in killing the survivors of a sunken ship. This single instance was The
Peleus Trial 96 in which the defendants were accused of killing survivors
of a sunken merchant vessel by the use of gunfire and hand grenades.
There is no record of any other case involving such charges directed at
German submarine personnel. The fact that this case stands alone may
be regarded as indicating its a berra tiona} character.
In the ensuing chapters appraisal will be made of the war crimes trials
92
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involving charges of violations of the laws of naval and submarine warfare. In particular the trial of Admiral Donitz of the German Navy before
the International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg for violation of the law
of submarine warfare during the Second War will be appraised.
In evaluating the war crimes trials conducted by the victorious allies at
the conclusion of the Second World War, Professor Lauterpacht has
stated:
The stature of those tribunals is bound to grow with the passage of
time and their judgments will be increasingly regarded as a weighty
contribution to International Law and justice. These judgmentsperhaps more than anything else-give a complexion of reality to any
attempt at a scientific exposition of the law of war, which never before
in history was so widely and so ruthlessly disregarded as in the Second
World War. In that perspective the occasional criticisms of these
courts as having been tribunals set up by the victor acting as judge
in his own cause must be deemed to be of limited importance. 97
Such an analysis does not, of course, preclude appraisal of the substantive
accuracy of determinations of law and of findings of fact made by particular war crimes tribunals including the International Military Tribunal at
Nuremberg.

D. SITUATIONS WHERE THE LAWS OF WAR ARE
APPLICABLE
A duly declared war with states as the participants in which all of the
participants recognize its character as "war" and in which there is no
issue concerning illegal resort to coercion is the obvious situation where
the laws of war apply. There are also other less obvious situations where
these laws apply.
There can be but little doubt that Germany's role in the Second World
War was that of a state illegally resorting to coercion by a war of conquest
and aggression contrary to its obligations under the Pact of Paris of 1928 98
renouncing the use of war as an instrument of national policy. If it follows
from this that every single military act of Germany, including its submarine
war, is illegal, careful analysis concerning the legality of particular
aspects of submarine warfare is unnecessary. It would simply be assumed
that the officers and crew of each German submarine were war criminals
without regard to whether they complied with the specific legal doctrines
applicable to naval war or not. Employing the same reasoning, if the
United States and the United Kingdom are regarded as states legally employing coercion, then it would follow that all of the particular features
of their conduct of submarine warfare would be deemed lawful even
97
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though they were substantially the same methods which were used by
Germany.
This issue concerning the relation between illegal resort to coercion and
the applicability of the laws of war was raised in the Trial of List 99 before
a United States Military Tribunal at the end of World War II. The
prosecution argued that since Germany's wars against Greece and Yugoslavia were illegal wars that Germany obtained no legal rights as a belligerent occupant and that the presence of German troops in those countries was unlawful. The Tribunal rejected the argument, stating:
For the purposes of this discussion, we accept the statement as true
that the wars against Yugoslavia and Greece were in direct violation
of the Kellogg-Briand Pact and were therefore criminal in character.
But it does not follow that every act by the German occupation forces
against person or property is a crime or ~hat any and every act undertaken by the population of the occupied country against the German
occupation forces thereby became· legitimate defense. 100
Other courts took the same position. It is particularly important that a
claim by the prosecution which was similar to that made in the Trial of
List was rejected by the International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg. 101
The result is that the illegal character of a particular participant's resort
to coerction does not relieve it from the applicability of the detailed rules
of the laws of war. The soundness of this position seems clear in view of
the central role of reciprocity as a sanction for the laws of war. Unless a
distinction is made between the illegal character of resort to coercion and
the applicability of the detailed requirements of the law concerning the
conduct of the coercion, an aggressor state might evade the detailed doctrines by the simple expedient of being the aggressor. If the aggressor state
were not subject to the law, it might shortly be claimed that the defending
state was also freed from adherence to the specific doctrines. The result
could be widespread destruction of human and material values of the kind
protected by the laws of war. In consequence, if the humanitarian objectives of the laws of war are to be effectuated, it is necessary that they be
applied without regard to the question of illegality in the initial resort to
coercion. 102 Therefore, in spite of the character of the German resort to
coercion in World War II as well as the documented Nazi murders of
99
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civilians on land, 103 the German submarine war must be appraised according to the same juridical criteria applied to the United States and the
United Kingdom submarine operations. By the same reasoning, the Japanese submarine war must also be appraised by the same criteria.
Another situation presenting- an issue concerning the applicability of the
laws of war is that involving a war which includes participants other than
states. For example, it has been stated with respect to collective action by
the United Nations that this international organization "has a superior legal and moral position as compared with the other party [presumably a national stateJ to the conflict." 104 From this it has been suggested that the
United Nations might "forbid use of atomic bombs by a state while reserving the right to use them itself." 105 It has also been concluded that:
[T]he United Nations should not feel bound by all the laws of war,
but should select such of the laws of war as may seem to fit its purposes (e.g., prisoners of war, belligerent occupation), adding such
others as may be needed, and rejecting those which seem incompatible
with its purposes. 106
To the extent that the United Nations rejected particular portions of the
laws of wars, the probable result would be lack of reciprocity and ensuing
breakdown of the law. If the United Nations picked and chose among
the laws of war this would seem to be an invitation for the opposing belligerents to do the same. During the Korean War, as a matter of fact, the
United Nations carefully observed the laws of war. 107 This seems a more
practical way of manifesting "a superior legal and moral position" than
the quoted alternative.
If one or more of the participants in war or hostilities is a rebel or insurgent group, there remain, nevertheless, the humanitarian reasons for
the application of the laws of war. Describing widespread violence as
"internal" does not mitigate its objective characteristics. In the United
103
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States Civil War, a situation of widespread rebellion, the laws of war were
applied. 108 If they had not been applied and if every single Confederate
soldier or sailor had been treated as a traitor, the result would probably
have been much greater destruction of values than actually occurred.
The Geneva Conventions of 1949 undertake the regulation of violence
in internal conflicts. The detailed rules of the Conventions are not applicable as such in civil wars but the Conventions provide that each of the
participants in an armed conflict "not of an international character" occurring in the territory of a contracting party must be bound at least by the
prescribed humanitarian standards. 109
Finally, the laws of war are applicable in war or hostilities without
regard to invocation of the label "war" or to the recognition of a state of
war by the participants. In 'relevant part the four Geneva Conventions
provide:
.
In addition to the provisions which shall be implemented in peace
time, the present Convention shalJ apply to all cases of declared war
or of any other armed conflict which may arise between two or more
of the High Contracting Parties, even if the state of war is not recognized by one of them. 110
As a matter of drafting, it might have been better to change the last clause
to read "even if the state of war is not recognized by one or more of them."
T1: is clear, nevertheless, that one of the fundamental purposes of the
Geneva Conventions is to obtain application of their detailed rules in all
situations involving the use of international coercion and violence. The
humanitarian objectives of the laws of war require an equally broad
application of the customary laws of wars.
~~

E. LIMITED WAR AND THE EFFECTIVE CONTROL OF INTERNATIONAL COERCION
Profe~sor

Quincy Wright has described the Historical functions performed by \var:
War has been the method actually used for achieving the major
political changes of the modern world, the building of nation-states,
the expansion of modern civilization throughout the world, and the
changing of the dominant interests of that civilization. 111
The same writer, even in 1942 before the advent of atomic weapons,
detected a certain modern disenchantment with war:
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There Is, however, a more. widespread opinion than in any other
period in history that war has not functioned well in the twentieth
century. From being a generally accepted instrument of statesmanship, deplored by only a few, war has, during the modern period,
come to be generally recognized as a problem. 112
The "problem" of preatomic times now involves the issue of survival of
the human race unless war can be effectively controlled. 113
In an era of weapons of mass destruction and of rapid missile delivery
techniques there are sound reasons to consider limited war as the rational
alternative to unlimited war until it is possible to abolish war altogether.
Policy makers who are concerned with national self-interest have persuasive inducements to avoid a war of mutual catastropic devastation. This
is not to say that an unlimited war is impossible since such a war could
take place by accident or miscalculation. It is only to say that an unlimited
war involving mass destruction without regard to rational political objectives does not serve the interests of any of the participants in such a war.
Limited war has been authoritatively described in these terms:
A limited war is one in which the belligerents restrict the purposes
for which they fight to concrete, well-defined objectives that do not
demand the utmost military effort of which the belligerents are capable and that can be accommodated in a negotiated settlement. Generally speaking, a limited war actively involves only two (or very few)
major belligerents in the fighting. The battle is confined to a local
geographical area and directed against selected targets-primarily
those of direct military importance. 114
In 1957 the United States Chief of Naval Operations stated his estimate
of future probabilities:
The Korean War was a limited war. A limited war is the type of war
most likely to occur in the thermonuclear age. 115
If a limited war with major powers among the participants is the most
probable type of war, there are compelling strategic reasons to be prepared
for it. There is also the opportunity to determine whether or not limited
war provides the effective means for the juridical limitation of international
coercion. Since limited war involves limited political objectives, it should
be clear that the coercion which is employed to achieve the objectives of
limited war must itself be limited both in scope and intensity. Assuming
that the belligerents comprise major powers with nuclear and thermonuclear capabilities, each must limit the coercion it employs. If this is not
done it will provoke expanded countercoercion with a resulting escalation
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of the war. In short, the military principle of economy of force must be
employed if a war is to be limited. This principle has been described as
follows:
It prescribes that in the use of armed force as an instrument of
national policy no greater force should be employed than is necessary
to achieve the objectives toward which it is directed; or, stated
another way, the dimensions of military force should be proportionate
to the value of the objective at stake. 116
Another type of war is limited in the sense that the belligerents are not
capable of greater military efforts than those involved in a limited war.
From the standpoint of such belligerents the war may be deemed to be
general in terms of the resources involved and the military effort exerted.
For the neutrals, such a war will nevertheless be regarded as limited. 117
Neutral interests in maintaining their peacetime activities should be a
powerful influence upon the belligerents in limiting the coercion employed.
It is not realistic to think that minor belligerents would be permitted to
disrupt the peaceful activities of the world community by the employment
of extensive military techniques.
The result of either kind of limited war should be to reduce belligerent
claims concerning legally permissible combatants, areas of operation, objects and methods of attack, and weapons of attack. If this is accurate,
it appears to be probable that a limited war would enhance the role of
law by reducing the types and amounts of the coercion employed. A
governmental decision to fight a limited war rather than a general one
would normally involve a high-level policy decision not to use some
methods and degrees of coercion which are lawful under the laws of war.
In view of the great disparity between the factual context of limited war
and unlimited war, it is even possible that some of the traditional legal
doctrines which were not honored during the World Wars, such as visit
and search at sea, could be maintained in limited war situations. It is
clear that a war of all-out thermonuclear devastation would leave little
or no role for law. Consequently, the term "general war" is used to refer
to a situation of comprehensive international coercion such as both the
World Wars in which only the traditional weapons are employed or to
the same type of war in which nuclear weapons are also employed but
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1n a carefully restricted manner. 118 General war in this sense and limited
war, in contrast to an all-out war of mutual destruction, provide the
opportunity to place meaningful juridical limitations upon the exercise
of international coercion. In each of the ensuing chapters the central legal
issues will be examined in the context of limited as well as general war. 119
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